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INTRODUCTION

The U.S. is struggling to effectively contest its adversaries in
cyberspace. It would seem natural for the U.S. to be the leader in
every aspect of internet operations, after all, the internet was invented
in the U.S., and the U.S. is dominant in many areas. However, there
are regions of cyberspace in which the U.S. is not the leader, perhaps
because of a misapprehension about the nature of cyberspace.1
This paper will provide a definition of cyberspace suitable for
national security strategy discussions and address how the U.S.
should approach cyberspace operations to engage its adversaries in
the most effective manner. Historically, the U.S. has been a
champion at leveraging soft power. Cyberspace has become an
essential way to increase the reach and penetration of soft power, yet
the U.S. appears on some levels to be losing in cyberspace to nonstate groups like ISIS and to other State actors such as Russia.
This paper suggests that it would be more effective to think
of cyberspace as a combination of infrastructure (the internet) and
the information and ideas that move across the infrastructure (the
ideosphere, as defined below). This model of cyberspace helps
increase the emphasis on engaging with the actors and information
using the internet in ways counter to U.S. national interests.
II.

BACKGROUND

Cyberspace is an unprecedented national security challenge. It
doesn’t align with standard U.S. government organizational
constructs, which are generally either geographic or defined by
specific functionality. Although it is hosted on physical infrastructure
that has a physical location, it’s often not helpful to think of
cyberspace in geographic terms. Additionally, it’s not straightforward
to characterize it functionally because cyber capabilities support every
At least one author rejects the notion that cyberspace can even have a
nature. This may reflect the definitional problem discussed below. See Lawrence
Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999).
1

3
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agency and activity, and enable adversary activities, as well as being
the primary focus of some adversary missions.
U.S. strategy seems to put less emphasis to acting on
information, rather, focusing on the physical elements of
cyberspace.2 Concentrating on the hardware and operating systems
– basically the internet – rather than other elements of cyberspace
requires confronting specific operational issues. The internet is, well,
the internet.
Disabling or destroying hardware in one location may have
transnational effects. It can raise sovereignty concerns for allies and
others, and restrict the ability of the U.S. to operate, in addition to
compromising intelligence equities. Perhaps most vexing though,
disabling or destroying hardware raises questions of how to attribute
those activities to individual actors. Engaging on content rather than
infrastructure can limit these issues. To some extent the U.S. has begun
to realize this, undertaking at least some discussion about engaging
ISIS on both its ability to use the internet to communicate, and about
changing the communications to alter the message.3
Infrastructure-focused strategy also represents a lost
opportunity. Cyber operations aren’t a particularly good method for
asserting national interests directly because of the ancillary effects set
out above, and because they tend to be packets of boutique
capabilities that don’t easily translate to large-scale operations.
However, cyberspace is an ideal medium for the exercise of soft
power.4 Spreading ideals of freedom of speech, economic principles,
and democratically-driven culture, for example, supports U.S.
national security interests. As noted below, U.S. adversaries have
Infra.
Sanger, U.S. Cyberattacks Target ISIS in a New Line of Combat, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/25/us/politics/us-directscyberweapons-at-isis-for-first-time.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&cl
ickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.na
v=top-news&_r=1.
4 Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction and
persuasion rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a
country’s culture, political ideals, and policies. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power (2004)
[hereinafter “Nye”], pp. 5-8.
2
3
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been more effective at using this aspect of cyber power to maximize
their interests, which often run contrary to those of the U.S. The U.S.
should do more to close this divide.
III.

RIVAL APPROACHES TO CYBERSPACE

Although the U.S. is skilled in cyber activity, its focus has
been on espionage and, to a lesser extent, on military activity aimed at
disrupting or damaging internet infrastructure. Focusing on cyber
infrastructure for non-intelligence operations has placed the U.S.
behind some of its rivals in important aspects of cyberspace. Set out
below are three examples of approaches to the strategic use of
cyberspace that largely focus on the content rather than the
infrastructure, along with suggestions regarding how the U.S. might
glean lessons from each.
A. China
The modern Chinese economy was built on commercial
espionage.5 The Chinese government has even gone so far as to
formalize the strategy of stealing intellectual property to advance its
economy, developing a branch of the PLA, Unit 61398, dedicated to
cyber espionage. By stealing industrial secrets to advance its
economic might, China is following a strategy modeled in the early
days of the U.S. The U.S. has protested, but it is hard to ignore the
historical irony of the situation. It was national policy in the early
days of the American republic to acquire European technology by
any means available, a policy that resulted in the U.S. emerging as the
world’s industrial leader.6 For example, in 1789 Samuel Slater
emigrated to the U.S., bringing with him an intimate knowledge of
the Arkwright spinning frames that had transformed textile
5 Joshua Philipp, Hacking and Espionage Fuel China’s Growth, EPOCH TIMES
(Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1737917-investigative-report
-china-theft-incorporated/.
6 Doron Ben-Atar, Trade Secrets: Intellectual Piracy and the Origins of American
Industrial Power (2004); Alexander Hamilton, Report on the Subject of Manufactures (Dec.
5, 1791), http://www.constitution.org/ah/rpt_manufactures.pdf.
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production in England. Using this knowledge, Slater set up the first
water-powered textile mill in the U.S. Two decades later, the
American businessman Francis Cabot Lowell talked his way into a
number of British mills, and memorized the plans for the hi-tech
Cartwright power loom.7
The U.S. and China agreed in 2015 not to engage in
commercial espionage against each other, but there is doubt China
will uphold its end of the bargain. If China violates the agreement the
U.S. government may respond with economic and political action,
but there is little that can be done by the U.S. to directly prevent
Chinese commercial espionage. Attempts to defend against espionage
have been less than completely successful. The U.S. government
could respond in kind, stealing intellectual property and other
commercial information from China through cyberspace – although
U.S. industry is generally advanced compared to Chinese industry –
so that course of action provides little gain.
For the U.S., the closest effective equivalent to Chinese
action might be to remove the barriers for private citizens to strike
back with cyber means as a response to being victimized by this type
of action. Often called “hacking back,” many companies have
expressed frustration with ineffective government action in the area,
and noted a willingness to use their own cyber expertise to retrieve
stolen data, render it unusable, or simply to punish perpetrators by
disrupting their networks. Government officials consistently note the
dangers in this type of action. 8 If the U.S. decided to change course
and allow self-help activity, it would have to consider amending
several statutes prohibiting unauthorized access to both computers
and data, at rest and in transit.9 However, there seems to be little

James Surowiecki, Spy vs. Spy, THE NEW YORKER (Jun. 9 & 16, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/09/spy-vs-spy-3.
8 Craig Timberg, Ellen Nakashima & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Cyberattacks
trigger talk of ‘hacking back,’ WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/business/technology/cyberattacks-trigger-talk-of-hackingback/2014/10/09/6f0b7a24-4f02-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_story.html.
9 These statutes include the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C.
§1030; the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 and the
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §2701. CFAA, in particular, is considered by
7
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appetite for this in Washington, and the U.S. has aggressively pursued
criminal action for what might be seen as relatively minor violations
of computer security statutes.10
B. ISIS
A non-state actor that has been active in cyberspace is ISIS. 11
ISIS has been successful at using social media to promote its message
of violence and recruit members. Al Hayat, ISIS’ media department,
has released carefully choreographed, ideology-focused videos that
have been called “Jihadi infomercials.”12 These videos present a
message encouraging would-be Jihadists and foreign fighters to
answer the call of duty. The videos feature foreign fighters appealing
to their brothers to reject Western values and join the fight. This
message provides a strong moral pull, appealing to the estranged and
isolated, particularly in Western Europe and in the U.S.
ISIS spreads its message using a variety of social media, the
most popular being Twitter and web forums. As ISIS advanced in its
territorial acquisitions, it posted pictures of hundreds of massacred
Iraqi soldiers on Twitter. The photos inspired horror and fear, which
appeared to be the intended result. ISIS videos of beheadings and
executions have been posted for maximum visibility. In a YouTube
video uploaded in August of 2014 an Iraqi police chief was beheaded.
His head was placed on his legs, and ISIS tweeted the picture with
the words, “This is our football, it’s made of skin.” The photo
included the hashtag #WorldCup, causing it to pop up in the news
some to be overly broad. See Electronic Frontier Foundation,
https://www.eff.org/issues/cfaa.
10 Mark Jaycox & Lee Tien, Obama's Computer Security Solution is a Mishmash of
Old, Outdated Policy Solutions, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Jan. 16, 2015),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/obamas-computer-security-solutionmish-mash-old-outdated-policy-solutions; Doe, FBI raids dental software researcher who
discovered private patient data on public server, DAILY DOT (May 27, 2016),
http://www.dailydot.com/politics/justin-shafer-fbi-raid/.
11 The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is also referred to as IS, ISIL,
and Daesh.
12 Jesse Singal, Why ISIS Is So Terrifyingly Effective at Seducing New Recruits,
N.Y. MAGAZINE (Aug. 18, 2014), http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2014/08/howisis-seduces-new-recruits.html.
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feeds of those following the hugely-popular soccer tournament in
Brazil, ensuring millions of views.13 ISIS also has foreign recruits use
their personal Facebook and Twitter pages to report positive
experiences about the movement, posting pictures of themselves
apparently living wealthily in extravagant houses, showing the
material upside to joining ISIS.14
The U.S. has tried to engage on social media, but at least with
publicly disclosed programs, it has generated more embarrassment
than success.15 As a nation, the U.S. has generally been good at using
soft power, even if it most often has been a happy byproduct of
American business success rather than a planned government activity.
During the Cold War, for example, East Germans were able to listen
to American punk rock and dissident announcements on Radio
Glasnost, which was run by private citizens.16 This was an example of
combining the natural attractiveness of Western culture with the
power of private citizens to tailor the narrative to suit U.S. national
security goals.

13 Tomlinson & White, This is our football, it's made of skin #World Cup: After
posting sickening beheading video of Iraqi policeman, ISIS boast of slaughtering 1,700 soldiers,
DAILY MAIL (Jun. 13, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2656905
/ISIS-jihadists-seize-two-towns-bear-Baghdad-U-S-tanks-helicopters-stolen-fleeing
-western-trained-Iraqi-forces.html.
14 Deborah Richards, The Twitter jihad: ISIS insurgents in Iraq, Syria using social
media to recruit fighters, promote violence, AUSTRALIA BROADCASTING CORPORATION
(Jun. 20, 2014), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-06-20/isis-using-social-mediato-recruit-fighters-promote-violence /5540474.
15 Such as trumpeting the decision to deploy more U.S. troops to Iraq when
that is one of the primary concerns of Muslims in the region. Elizabeth Cohen &
Debra Goldschmidt, Ex-terrorist explains how to fight ISIS online, CNN (Dec. 21,
2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/18/health/al-quaeda-recruiter-fight-isisonline/.
16 Esme Nicholson, The Cold War Broadcast That Gave East German Dissidents
a Voice, NPR (Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/11/
08/361160675/the-cold-war-broadcast-that-gave-east-german-dissidents-a-voice.
Radio and television from West Germany was quite effective at educating East
German audiences on the benefits of the non-Communist world. Esther von
Richthofen, Bringing Culture to the Masses: Control, Compromise and Participation in the
GDR (2009), p. 103.
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The diverse population of the U.S., the production and
international distribution of films and television programs, American
domination in the music and sports scenes, and the availability of
U.S. higher education to foreigners have all helped build an
impressive machine for the U.S. to wield soft power. 17 Although this
may not translate directly into advancing U.S. national interests, it
does show the potential for spreading U.S.-based information
effectively. This attraction to popular cultural has helped the U.S.
achieve important foreign policy goals, such as reconstruction after
WWII and victory in the Cold War.18
Unfortunately, the relative ability of the U.S. to project soft
power seems to have diminished in the past several years. The U.S.
has reduced its credibility in the Middle East by engaging in multiple
conflicts there and demonstrating little cultural understanding. 19 The
internet-enabled lower barrier to entry for news channels and
information distribution has increased competition for the attention
of the masses, and decreased the ease with which the U.S. can project
its values. Official outlets in other States are more trusted by foreign
countries, while U.S. official outlets are less trusted abroad than
unofficial U.S. outlets.
To regain its soft power mojo, the U.S. must evolve, learning
to use information to its advantage. It’s easy to see, for example, how
some stories could present a favorable contrast between the
adversary’s cause and Western values, e.g., reportage on ISIS killing
male European jihadists who arrive in theater, and subjecting females
who arrive to sexual slavery.20 There is some hope on this front, as

Nye, supra FN. 4, at Chap. 2.
Nye, supra FN. 4, at 49-53.
19 President George W. Bush’s announcement of the “war on terror” and
call for democratization of the Muslim world, for example, failed to engage with
the local population and damaged U.S. soft power reserves. Nye, “The Future of
Soft Power in U.S. Foreign Policy,” in Soft Power and US Foreign Policy (2010), pp. 47.
20 Nadette de Visser, ISIS Eats Its Own, Torturing and Executing Dutch Jihadists.
Or Did It?, DAILY BEAST (1 Mar. 2016), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
2016/03/01/isis-eats-its-own-torturing-and-executing-dutch-jihadists-or-didit.html; Sam Webb, “‘'A living hell': The grim fate that awaits British teenage girls
17
18
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the U.S. Secretary of State met with Hollywood executives to discuss
the impact on groups like ISIS of how the U.S. is portrayed in
movies.21
In the absence of an effective U.S. government response to
terrorist successes in cyberspace, and under pressure to do something,
private companies have begun to step up their game. Notably,
Google has developed a capability to redirect searches for terrorist
information to pre-existing anti-terrorist material on YouTube.22 It’s
too early to determine how effective the program will be.
This issue remains on the radar of strategic thinkers in the
U.S. government, as well. Recently, the State Department began a
new campaign to help slow recruitment efforts from extremist
groups like ISIS. For example, under the new campaign, the U.S. has
been shifting away from directly sending messages to potential ISIS
recruits through the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications (CSCC), as it proved to be ineffective.23 The CSCC
approach was ultimately abandoned after being reviewed by a team
comprised of non-governmental individuals. The reviewers
undoubtedly observed that it wasn’t very effective to counter an
organization that operates under the notion that Western
governments are illegitimate with official statements from one of
believed
to
be
joining
ISIS,”
Mirror
(Feb.
21,
2015),
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/a-living-hell-grim-fate-5203372.
21 Ryan Faughnder, John Kerry meets with Hollywood studio executives to talk
Islamic State, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment
/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-john-kerry-hollywood-isis-20160216-story.html.
22 Jack Detsch, How Google aims to disrupt the Islamic State propaganda machine,
PASSCODE (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2016/
0907/How-Google-aims-to-disrupt-the-Islamic-State-propaganda-machine?cmpid
=ema:nws:Daily%2520Newsletter%2520%2809-07-2016%29&utm_source=Sailth
ru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20160907_Newsletter:%20Daily&utm_t
erm=Daily.
23 Executive Order 13584, Developing an Integrated Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications Initiative (Sept. 9, 2011); Simon Cottee, Why It’s So Hard to Stop ISIS
Propaganda, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.or
g/archive/2016/April/Pages/USProceedingwithNewStrategy toCounterISIL.aspx;
Hayes Brown, “Meet The State Department Team Trying To Troll ISIS Into
Oblivion,” Think Progress (Sept. 18, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/
09/18/3568366/think-again-turn-away/.
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those governments. One of the reviewers noted that ‘“it’s not the
U.S. government that’s going to break the [Islamic State] brand. It’s
going to be third parties.”’24
Reloading, the Department of State has now created the
Global Engagement Center (GEC), which is designed to enable
partners in countries with a majority Muslim population to act as
messengers, rather than the State Department delivering information
directly.25 The GEC is supposed to be the single entity in charge of
coordinating social media engagement to counter terrorist
organizations like ISIS. It promises to engage in “rigorous research
and modern data analysis” as well as “create, develop and sustain
effective positive alternative narratives consistent with U.S. policy
objectives.”26 Unfortunately, while these are appropriate objectives,
they seem inconsistent with maintaining rapid-fire engagement like
that undertaken by motivated individuals supporting ISIS, who
appear to receive little guidance from higher headquarters, but have
managed to control the narrative.27
Favorable facts must reach the targeted populations quickly
to make a difference, however: “Falsehood flies, and the Truth
comes limping after it.”28 Information programs encumbered by a
cautious bureaucratic process will never be timely enough to make
much of a difference. Crowdsourcing appears to be superior to
government in every aspect of internet engagement. 29 However, it is
24 Greg Miller, Panel casts doubt on U.S. propaganda efforts against ISIS, WASH.
POST (Dec. 2, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/panel-castsdoubt-on-us-propaganda-efforts-against-isis/2015/12/02/ab7f9a14-9851-11e594f0-9eeaff906ef3_story.html?postshare=901449106173651&tid=ss_tw.
25 E.O. 13721, Developing an Integrated Global Engagement Center To Support
Government-wide Counterterrorism Communications Activities Directed Abroad (Mar. 14,
2016), http://www.jurist.org/documents/executiveorders/13721.php.
26 Id.
27 Philip Kapusta, The Gray Zone, SPECIAL WARFARE (Oct.-Dec. 2015 (p.
22), http://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/SW2804/October%202015%20
Special%20Warfare.pdf.
28 Attributed to Jonathan Swift (1710).
29 Ariana Eunjung Cha, What Yelp can tell you about a hospital that official ratings
can’t, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/toyour-health/wp/2016/04/05/going-to-the-hospital-read-the-yelp-reviews-first/.
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not clear that the State Department understands the importance of
nongovernmental involvement.
An additional issue with government agencies disseminating
information involves the restrictions setforth in the Smith-Mundt Act,
which prohibits the domestic distribution of public diplomacy
information.30 Smith-Mundt has been interpreted broadly inside the
government as prohibiting the dissemination of information by
means that might be seen by Americans.31 This creates a difficult
standard when the material is online and anyone in the world could
potentially see those materials. The federal government shouldn’t be
attempting to influence U.S. audiences, but when this type of
guidance is broadly interpreted it ignores the reality of cyberspace.
The result renders U.S. information efforts impotent and cedes the
field to terrorists who then control the narrative, unopposed.
Even though Smith-Mundt was amended in 2013 to address
this issue, it remains unclear how the law will be interpreted going
forward.32 There appears to be residual resistance to distributing
information by cyber means because of the potential exposure of
American citizens.33 As a fully realized democratic society, the U.S. is
especially concerned about maintaining a reputation for truthfulness
in the government. That is not true of every U.S. competitor.

30 Matt Armstrong has written extensively on Smith-Mundt, for example at
Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012 Introduced in House, MOUNTAINRUNNER (May
17, 2012), https://mountainrunner.us/2012/05/smith-mundt-modernization-ac/.
31 It’s unclear at this point whether or when practice will change to match
the change in the law.
32 Mick West, Debunked: 2013 NDAA Thornberry amendment, domestic
propaganda,
disinformation,
METABUNK.ORG
(May
21,
2012),
https://www.metabunk.org/debunked-2013-ndaa-thornberry-amendmentdomestic-propaganda- disinformation.t592/.
33 Nafeez Ahmed, Your Government Wants to Militarize Social Media to Influence
Your Beliefs, MOTHERBOARD (Nov. 14, 2016), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/
your-government-wants-to-militarize-social-media-to-influence-your-beliefs.
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C. Russia
The Russians are masters of using cyberspace to advance
their information agenda. Russia leverages disinformation on an
industrial scale, for example, by spreading misleading claims about
Sweden’s stockpiling of nuclear weapons, stating that nuclear
weapons on a Turkish base were at risk, by persistently denying the
presence of Russian troops in Ukraine, and most recently, by leading
a misinformation campaign during the 2016 U.S. presidential
election.34 In addition, they have been comfortable allowing, even
encouraging, private citizens to engage in offensive cyber activities
when they coincide with national interests.35
Russia’s willingness to engage the private sector in this
fashion is one reason that it has been able to remain at the forefront
of cybersecurity operationally and diplomatically. Other States have
been less willing to take this step. In fact, despite Russia’s success
with this tactic, the U.S. and other Western countries do everything
they can to prevent private actors from engaging in offensive cyber
activities. This is reminiscent of continental Europe’s reaction to
England’s mastery of the 14th century’s super-weapon, the longbow.
England adopted the use of the longbow early in its history.
From the beginning, it was clear the longbow’s range and penetration
power was superior to those of other weapons of its time. Longbows
put crossbows to shame, being only a fraction of the cost, with a
much greater firing speed and range. It was a perfect, inexpensive
Neil MacFarquhar, A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/29
/world/europe/russia-sweden-disinformation.html?_r=1; Shane Harris, “Clinton
Foundation: Those Hacked Files’ Aren’t Ours, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 4, 2016),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2016/10/04/clinton-foundation-thosehacked-files-aren-t-ours.html; U.S. was reportedly more prepared for Russian cyber attacks
than disinfomation campaign, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2016), https://venturebeat.com/2016
/12/20/u-s-was-reportedly-more-prepared-for-russian-cyber-attacks-thandisinformation-campaign/.
35 See Allen & Leeson, infra note 33; Levi Maxey, Cyber Proxies: A Central
Tenet of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare, THE CIPHER BRIEF (Feb. 24, 2017),
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/tech/cyber-proxies-central-tenet-russiashybrid-warfare-1092.
34
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weapon for peasants, as it was basically a stick of wood. Masses of
peasants armed with longbows were so critical to the defense of the
realm that Edward I prohibited all manner of sport among the
peasantry except archery, and Edward III made weekly archery
practice obligatory, banning other forms of competing activities.36
Henry VIII compelled longbow ownership and also prohibited
activities that competed with the mandatory longbow practice. 37 The
result of making archery the only lawful recreational activity for
decades was a large mass of superbly capable “special forces”
available to the king. England’s domination in this field was
complete.
England basically maintained its monopoly on longbow use
for one hundred and fifty years. This wasn’t because wood and
peasants were in short supply elsewhere, nor because other rulers
didn’t know how effective the longbow was, but because other
kingdoms lacked the political stability to trust such a powerful
weapon in the hands of the rabble.38 England was favored with the
political stability that gave it confidence to encourage a talented and
armed population. The opportunity to “crowd-source” longbow
techniques and skills significantly improved England’s military
capability. Currently, Russia is employing a similar strategy in the case
of hacking skills.
Although it may not be the most stable State in the world,
Russia has enough national coherence that it has allowed a number of
private citizens to practice with powerful cyber tools. Russia’s level of
comfort with its political stability and unity has allowed it to leverage
the power of private citizens to perfect the use of a powerful weapon.
This hasn’t given Moscow a monopoly on cyber weaponry, but has
provided a different element to its cyber strategy, meriting

36 Douglas W. Allen & Peter T. Leeson, Institutionally Constrained Technology
Adoption: Resolving the Longbow Puzzle, THE J. OF L. & ECON. (2015) [hereinafter “Allen
& Leeson”] p. 683, 688, http://www.peterleeson.com/Longbow.pdf.
37 Allen & Leeson, p. 689.
38 England’s longbow dominance lasted from about 1332-1428. Allen &
Leeson, pp. 683-684.
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comparison with the English longbow model. 39 Cyber criminals are
allowed to hone their hacking skills and their hacking tools, using
both for the advancement of outward-directed criminal enterprises.
Russia allows this broad access to a powerful means of warfare,
resulting in the development of a trained cadre of cyber operators
with ever-improving tools. While Russia must accept the inherent risk
that this cyber capability could be turned against the regime’s interest,
it can also avail itself of this force when the nationalist sentiment can
be employed to in advance State interests. The Kremlin is in a
position to purchase the loyalty of these groups by acquiescing in the
commission of cyber crime, creating a shared interest.40
In addition to leveraging patriotic feelings and private cyber
expertise, Russia actively manipulates social media for its national
security purposes, both internally and abroad. For example, people
are hired to post negative comments about anti-Russia articles online,
and do the opposite for pro-Russia articles, with the intent to
overwhelm rational discourse on Western media sites.41 These
Russian professionals have also used Twitter falsely to report an oil
spill and an Ebola outbreak in the U.S., perhaps testing a capability to
manipulate public opinion and create confusion and mistrust.42
Even if these false messages reach only a relatively small number of
people, social networks have an extraordinary power to convince
people and manipulate opinion. 43

Trend Micro increasingly observes hackers’ relationships with official
authorities and their participation in conflicts. Max Goncharov, Russian Underground
2.0, TREND MICRO (2015), http://www.trendmicro.fr/media/wp/russianunderground-2-0-wp-en.pdf.
40 Mathew J. Schwartz, Russian Cybercrime Rule No. 1: Don't Hack Russians,
BANK
INFO
SECURITY
(Sept.
14,
2015),
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/blogs/russian-cybercrime-rule-no-1-dont-hackrussians-p-1934.
41 Daisy Sindelar, The Kremlin’s Troll Army, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 12, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/the-kremlins-trollarmy/375932/.
42 Adrian Chin, The Agency, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jun. 2, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html?_r=0.
43 The Social-Network Illusion That Tricks Your Mind, MIT TECH. REV. (Jun. 30,
2015), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/538866/the-social-network-illusion39
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The U.S. might learn from Russia’s use of both social media
and private actors. The distinction between the way ISIS uses social
media and the way Russia does is that ISIS reports its activities,
however mortifying they are, and attempts to spin its own situation
to look enticing to recruits. Russia uses social media outlets to
manipulate public opinion in ways that aren’t apparent, and using
means that aren’t easily attributable to Moscow. There is evidence
that U.S. companies manipulate the news to benefit their perceived
interests, as well, so it isn’t as if this technique is unknown inside the
U.S., it just doesn’t appear to be used by the government.44
Although the U.S. has been reluctant to employ the “cyber
longbow” like the Russians have, there are plenty of examples of
private citizens performing useful national security work merely as an
unplanned collateral result of acts of conscience or activism. People
around the globe have joined to oppose ISIS online, both as
individuals and as part of groups like Ghost Sec. 45 Some are actively
engaging; others are taking good citizen-type actions such as

that-tricks-your-mind/; Sean Gallagher, Air Force research: How to use social media to
control people like drones, ARS TECHNICA (Jul 17, 2014),
http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/07/air-force-research-howto-use-social-media-to-control-people-like-drones/.
44 Michael Nunez, Former Facebook Workers: We Routinely Suppressed
Conservative News, GIZMODO (May 9, 2016), http://gizmodo.com/formerfacebook-workers-we-routinely-suppressed-conser-1775461006; Reena Flores,
Hillary Clinton Google suggestions accused of favoring candidate, CBS NEWS (Jun. 11, 2016),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/hillary-clinton-google-suggestions-accusedfavoring-candidate-election-2016/. As noted in the article, Google denies
manipulating the results.
45 Shashank Shekhar, Desi hackers join cyber war on ISIS: 'Hacktivist' group
Anonymous says 1,000 Indians are sniffing out jihadi Twitter accounts and websites, DAILY
MAIL
INDIA
(Nov.
25,
2015),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-3334089/Desi-hackersjoin-cyber-war-ISIS-Hacktivist-group-Anonymous-says-1-000-Indians-sniffingjihadi-Twitter-accounts-websites.html; Jack Smith IV, Anonymous Divided: Inside the
Two Warring Hacktivist Cells Fighting ISIS Online, TECH.MIC (December 04, 2015),
http://mic.com/articles/129679/anonymous-vs-isis-how-ghostsec-and-ghostsecurity-group-are-targeting-terrorists#.tEWnKSnXD.
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reporting Twitter accounts that support terrorist activities. Terrorist
attacks in Paris motivated many online to strike back at ISIS.46
Individual actions aren’t limited to opposing terrorist groups.
Hackers have lashed out at China in support of pro-democracy
protesters in Hong Kong. 47 The hacker group Anonymous released
information about drug-related corruption in Mexico, after finding
government action there ineffective.48 Anonymous also decided to
support protests in support of democracy in Hong Kong, taking
down thirty government sites.49 Additionally, a group called the Elves
works to counter Kremlin trolls who spread propaganda and
disinformation about Lithuania.50 Child pornography has also become

46 Andrew Blake, #OpISIS and #OpParis: Anonymous hacktivists to retaliate
against ISIS after Paris attacks, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2015),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/nov/16/opisis-and-opparisanonymous-hacktivists-to-retali/; Swati Khandelwal, “#ParisAttacks —
Anonymous declares War on ISIS: 'We will Hunt you Down!,'” Hacker News (Nov.
16, 2015), http://thehackernews.com/2015/11/parisattacks-anonymous-isis.html;
David Goldman & Mark Thompson, “Anonymous blocks jihadist website in
retaliation for Charlie Hebdo attack,”
CNN (Jan. 12, 2015)
http://money.cnn.com/2015/01/11/technology/security/anonymous-charliehebdo/.
47 Mary-Ann Russon, Anonymous brings down 30 Chinese government websites to
support Hong Kong protesters, INT’L. BUS. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2015),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/anonymous-brings-down-30-chinese-governmentwebsites-support-hong-kong-protesters-1496069.
48 Rodrigo Bijou, Governments don't understand cyber warfare. We need hackers,
TED
(Dec. 2015), https://www.ted.com/talks/rodrigo_bijou_governments_don_t_
understand_cyber_warfare_we_need_hackers/transcript?language=en.
49 Mary-Ann Russon, Anonymous brings down 30 Chinese government websites to
support Hong Kong protesters, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2015),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/anonymous-brings-down-30-chinese-governmentwebsites-support-hong-kong-protesters-1496069.
50 Michael Weiss, The Baltic Elves Taking on Pro-Russian Trolls, DAILY BEAST
(Mar. 20, 2016), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/03/20/the-balticelves-taking-on-pro-russian-trolls.html. The group has been compared to the
resistance fighters in the region during WWII.
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a target of citizen hacker groups.51 These are all indications that some,
at least, see hacking as a legitimate form of citizen action. 52
To emulate the success of the Russians, the U.S. may have to
trust the public with the cyber longbow. Private companies have
employed hackers to their advantage, even going so far as using such
hackers in the fight against U.S. adversaries. There are some
indications the U.S. government might permit private citizens with
cyber capabilities to use them wisely in certain circumstances.53 When
the FBI was unable to access the iPhone of the terrorists who killed
14 people in San Bernardino, California – and Apple refused to assist
– the Bureau reportedly paid hackers to accomplish the task.54 The
government has also shown signs it will work with hackers to
advance national defense, with programs like “Hack the Pentagon,”
in which it offers a bounty to hackers who find and report
vulnerabilities in DoD computer networks.55

Anonymous Hacktivist Group Now Gunning for Powerful Pedophile Networks,
SPUTNIK
NEWS
(Jan
26,
2016),
http://sputniknews.com/europe/20150124/1017301478.html#ixzz48LNRiLjF.
52 Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, A Notorious Hacker Is Trying to Start a
‘Hack Back’ Political Movement, MOTHERBOARD (May 23, 2016),
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/notorious-hacker-phineas-fishers-istrying-to-start-a-hack-back-political-movement.
53 Katie Moussouris, Hackers Can Be Helpers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/03/30/should-hackers-help-thefbi/hackers-can-be-helpers; Nichole Hong, U.S. Revamps Line of Attack in SocialMedia Fight Against Islamic State, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 28, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-revamps-line-of-attack-in-social-media-fightagainst-islamic-state1472415600?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Defense
%20EBB%2008-29-16&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief.
54 Shane Harris, Did the FBI Just Unleash a Hacker Army on Apple?, DAILY
BEAST (Mar. 29, 2016),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/03/29/did-the-fbi-just-unleash-ahacker-army-on-apple.html; Kevin Pousen, Double Cross, WIRED (May 2016),
https://www.wired.com/2016/05/maksym-igor-popov-fbi/.
55 Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on DoD’s Hack the
Pentagon, CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE PRESS OPERATIONS (Mar. 2, 2016),
http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-ReleaseView/Article/684106/statement-by-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-on-dodshack-the-pentagon-cybe.
51
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Of course, hackers tend to be independent thinkers and
actors who have their own conception of right and wrong. One of
the bigger challenges presented by these groups includes using their
skills to interrupt lawful discourse. For example, groups have acted to
prevent a candidate from running for public office and hacked a
newspaper because it published information that they didn’t agree
with.56 While it’s certainly true that most private groups come with
significant baggage, there simply is no substitute for crowdsourcing. 57
The opportunity to leverage the efforts of millions of people around
the globe to invent, solve, and improve is perhaps cyberspace’s
greatest strength. No government effort can compete with the results
of this type of massive collaboration over the long haul, even if it is
as unsavory in its methods as hacking ISIS Twitter accounts with
pornography.58 And, surely no government agency would have rickrolled ISIS, unleashing the devastating Rick Astley on potential ISIS
recruits.59
The U.S. has tended to shy away from citizen groups like
Anonymous because the groups’ often offensive behavior, and,
because they sometimes act against the U.S. government’s perceived
interests. Sometimes the obnoxious activities can’t be ignored, but
most hacker groups seem generally to be in favor of democratic rule
and freedom, so there ought to be much common ground with the
56 Id.; Catalin Cimpanu, Anonymous Warns US Sen. Ted Cruz to Leave Presidential
Race, or Else, SOFTPEDIA (Mar. 21, 2016),
http://news.softpedia.com/news/anonymous-warns-us-sen-ted-cruz-to-leavepresidential-race-or-else -502009.shtml; Waqas Amir, Hacktivists Shut Down Donald
Trump
Hotel
Collections
Website,
HACKREAD
(May
21,
2016),
https://www.hackread.com/donald-trump-hotel-collections-website-down/.
57 Dai Davis, Hacktivism: Good or Evil?, COMPUTER WKLY. (Mar. 2014),
http://www.computerweekly.com/opinion/Hacktivism-Good-or-Evil.
58 Jacob Bogage, This hacker is fighting ISIS by spamming its Twitter accounts with
porn, WASH. POST (Jun. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2016/06/14/this-hacker-is-fighting-isis-by-spamming-its-twitteraccounts-with-porn/?utm_campaign=Defense%20EBB%206-1516&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Sailthru.
59 James Geddes, Hacking Group Anonymous Using Rick Astley Video to Rickroll
ISIS,
TECH
TIMES
(Nov.
28,
2015),
http://www.techtimes.com/articles/110795/20151128/hacking-groupanonymous-using-rick-astley-video-to-rickroll-isis-video.htm.
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U.S. government. The benefits of exploiting the commonality could
be enough to outweigh the negative. The general resistance to
cooperating with the government creates an obvious barrier to
working with hacker groups, and the challenges shouldn’t be
underestimated, but the potential is so great the government ought to
make an effort. The U.S. should search for those areas of overlapping
interests, subtly encouraging, or at least not discouraging, private
action in these areas.
Russia appears to have found a way to keep the groups that it
works with under control, and the U.S. must do likewise if it intends
to make better use of this resource. Russia enjoys the benefit of
working with groups motivated by money. Wealth is a
straightforward way to secure the cooperation of these groups. Less
concrete goals of groups like Anonymous – increased freedom? more
free speech? – present a greater, but not insurmountable, challenge.
IV.

A WAY FORWARD

One thing that might be preventing more creative U.S.
national security activities in cyberspace is how the U.S government
defines the actual term “cyberspace.” Rethinking that definition
should be the first step in any U.S. rebalancing efforts. 60
The U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace uses the terms
“digital infrastructure” and “internet” throughout as stand-ins for
cyberspace.61 Similarly, the Department of Defense (DoD) defines
cyberspace as, “A global domain within the information environment
consisting of the interdependent network of information technology
The word cyberspace is a bit of a historical accident. Novelist William
Gibson is credited with coining the term. He wanted a “really hot name” to use in
his novels, and recognized the value of cyberspace because it was evocative of
much
but
“meant
absolutely
nothing.”
https://www.brainpickings.org/2014/08/26/how-william-gibson-coinedcyberspace/.
61 International
Strategy
for
Cyberspace
(May,
2011),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy
_for_cyberspace.pdf.
60
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infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded
processors and controllers.”62 Both of these terms suggest an
approach focused on the physical aspect of cyberspace, largely
ignoring the people and thoughts (content) that make cyberspace
important.
A more useful approach looks at cyberspace as “the internet
plus the ideosphere.” Taking the terms separately, the internet is the
global communication network that allows computers to connect and
exchange information, consisting of hardware such as servers,
routers, cables, and switches, as well as the software necessary for the
hardware to operate.
The ideosphere, on the other hand, is the “place” where
ideas are created and grow. It’s where thoughts and theories are made
and evaluated.63 As ideas interact, often instantly on a global scale
only possible through cyberspace, they change form. The evolution
of ideas is in some ways like the evolution of living organisms, but
much faster. Ideas fuse, recombine, and evolve rapidly. The basic
element of replication in the ideosphere is the meme, which serves in
a role analogous to the gene in physical reproduction. 64 There are
many aspects of the ideosphere, but it may be simplest to define it as
“the universe of ideas.”65 It is here where U.S. adversaries excel, and,
as a result, where the U.S. needs to focus.
If strategic thinking about cyberspace were guided by a
framework of cyberspace as the internet plus the ideosphere, strategy
would be less likely to focus on infrastructure, and more likely to
concentrate on engaging with the content in cyberspace. Jim Lewis,
Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
puts it this way, “The problem in the US is we’re very militarized, so
62 JP
1-02,
D OD
DICTIONARY
(Feb.
15,
2016),
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
63 Douglas Hofstadter, METAMAGICAL THEMAS: QUESTING FOR THE
ESSENCE OF MIND AND PATTERN, 50 (1987).
64 Google defines meme as “a humorous image, video, piece of text, etc. that
is copied (often with slight variations) and spread rapidly by Internet users.”
65 Hofstadter, at 50-51.
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we tend to think about attacking infrastructure. The Russian
approach is much more political and about trying to manipulate
public opinion.”66 A disadvantage of focusing on infrastructure is that
everyone has an interest in keeping the internet functional, and that
significantly limits engaging with the infrastructure itself.67 It’s the
information and ideas that U.S. adversaries are using to their
advantage, and information should be a priority for U.S. national
security efforts. At least one U.S. ally has taken steps in this direction.
Britain’s NSA equivalent, GCHQ, apparently engages with terrorist
internet content to discredit and embarrass leadership, in addition to
issuing false orders to individual terrorists (or potential ones). 68
Focusing engagement on content rather than infrastructure
has the added benefit of avoiding one of the thornier problems of
waging cyber-war – attribution. The U.S., for obvious reasons, seeks
to avoid negative effects on infrastructure owned by its political allies.
Information, on the other hand, can be weighed by reference only to
the information itself. Sophisticated technical operations are required
to determine whether engagement is appropriate. If information is
helpful to an adversary it can be addressed regardless of the source
and without effect on infrastructure.69

Jack Detsch, In aftermath of the DNC hack, experts warn of new front in digital
warfare,
PASSCODE
(Aug.
10,
2016),
http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Passcode/2016/0810/In-aftermath-of-the-DNC-hack-experts-warn-ofnew-front-in-digital-warfare?cmpid=ema:nws:Daily%2520Newsletter%2520%280
8-10-2016%29&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=201
60810_Newsletter:%20Daily&utm_term=Daily.
67 Taking down connected networks quickly decreases the utility of the
other networks, as well. Metcalfe’s Law states that the value of a network is
proportional to the square of the number of users, a concept whose implications
for military operations will have to be explored elsewhere.
68 Forno & Joshi, America is ‘dropping cyberbombs’ – but how do they work?, THE
CONVERSATION (May 11, 2016), https://theconversation.com/america-isdropping-cyberbombs-but-how-do-they-work58476?mc_cid=a6d6f926a2&mc_eid=3284b6aba6.
69 Consistent with Constitutional protections, which tend to be applied to
everyone regardless of nationality.
66
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CHALLENGES

The First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech may
be the single most important right that defines what it means to be an
American.70 A key component of the exercise of free speech is the
ability to communicate freely without government interference.
Distinguishing protected speech from impermissible speech will
always be an issue in the U.S.71 A particular complicating factor is that
often, speech is permissible under some circumstances but not
others. Fiction and satire are examples of vehicles that can protect
normally unlawful speech. On the other hand, shouting “fire” when
there is none could be a lawful (albeit not very funny) joke, but may
be unlawful if that same joke resulted in injury or harm for people
trying to escape the building in which the joke was made.
An illustration of how challenging putting all this together
can be is Microsoft’s policy on dealing with “terrorist content.”
Microsoft’s approach includes definitions of prohibited speech
(which includes “. . . endorses a terrorist organization or its acts …”)
and an exclusion for its search engine, which will still be allowed to
return content responsive to searches for terrorist content. 72 For the
government to engage aggressively to remove content that is
damaging to national security (i.e., terrorist recruiting, lethal
knowledge like bomb making skills, or offensive propaganda) it must
find a way to determine when unpleasant or undesirable speech
crosses the line from constitutionally protected to legally
impermissible, based on content or context. Microsoft’s approach
isn’t perfect, but it’s an example of a corporate citizen taking up the
cyber longbow on its own.

“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein” West Virginia
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 625 (1943).
71 Matthew Weybrecht, Free Speech in an Era of Self-Radicalization, L AWFARE
(Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/free-speech-era-self-radicalization.
72 Microsoft’s
Approach to Terrorist Content Online (May 20, 2016),
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2016/05/20/microsofts-approachterrorist-content-online/#sm.0000g8l17to0xdtzrca20pluw755v.
70
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The involvement of private entities in national cyber security
is particularly important because they can act in ways the government
cannot, and act with information they already have in the course of
business or from open sources. Many government activities would
require accessing online information, yet proposals that make it easier
– or even appear to make it easier – for the government to access
private information are instantly condemned. 73 The 2013 revelations
of Edward Snowden caused a firestorm of protests against the NSA’s
surveillance activities, even though the spying programs were lawful
under U.S law. The passing of the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and
Protection Act (CISPA)74 in 2013 and Protecting Cyber Networks
Act (PCNA)75 in 2015 also caused public outrage.76 There simply
seems to be a consensus, at least among politically active citizens, that
the government should not be allowed to access and monitor large
quantities of citizens’ data, even to better ensure the security of the
U.S.77

Sorcher, Digital activists begin broad, grass-roots battle to fight anti-encryption bill,
PASSCODE (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode
/2016/0415/Digital-activists-begin-broad-grass-roots-battle-to-fightantiencryption-bill?cmpid=ema:nws:Daily%2520Newsletter%2520%2804-152016%29&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20160415
_Newsletter:%20Daily&utm_term=Daily.
74 CISPA directs the federal government to conduct cybersecurity activities
to provide shared situational awareness enabling integrated operational actions to
protect, prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from cyber incidents.
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/624.
75 This amends the National Security Act of 1947 to require the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) to develop and promulgate procedures to promote: (1)
the timely sharing of classified and declassified cyber threat indicators in possession
of the federal government with private entities, non-federal governmental agencies,
or state, tribal, or local governments; and (2) the sharing of imminent or ongoing
cybersecurity threats with such entities to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts.
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1560.
76 https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2885-coalition-letter-from55-civil-society-groups-security-experts-and-academics-opposingpcna/Coaltion%20Letter%20Strongly%20Opposing%20PCNA.b24d1869025848c
b96385603d8208dea.pdf.
77 Deena Zaru, Dilemmas of the Internet age: privacy vs. security, CNN (Mar. 29,
2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/04/politics/deena-zaru-internet-privacysecurity-al-franken/.
73
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Even the FBI’s request for Apple to crack the encryption on
the iPhone belonging to the San Bernardino shooter has generated
outrage in a large segment of the population. 78 U.S. citizens have an
increasing fear of governmental violations of privacy. A majority of
the American people don’t trust the government, and are concerned
that the government’s access to private information will result in
violations of privacy and free speech. 79
From the FBI’s perspective, this was an easy call. The
phone’s owner was dead, along with the privacy interests, and his
phone may have contained information to help stop other terrorist
attacks. Although Apple didn’t have the ability to crack the phone’s
encryption, it seemed the corporation would be best positioned to
develop the capability to assist in the case. 80 The privacy community
(and Apple) saw it differently, however.
Apple asserted that developing the technique would set a
dangerous precedent and would create a threat to the data security of
its customers.81 In the end, Apple refused to budge and the FBI
contracted with an information security company that was able break
the encryption on the phone so the FBI could access the
information.82

78 Kim Zetter, Apple’s FBI Battle Is Complicated. Here’s What’s Really Going On,
WIRED (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/apples-fbi-battle-iscomplicated-heres-whats-really-going-on/.
79 A recent study conducted by Pew Research Center found that only 19%
of Americans trust the government. Henry Gass, How do Americans view government?
Survey finds both distrust and hope, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 23, 2015),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2015/1123/How-do-Americans-viewgovernment-Survey-finds-both-distrust-and-hope.
80 See Zetter, Apples FBI Battle is Complicated. Here’s What’s Really Going on,
WIRED (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/apples-fbi-battle-iscomplicated-heres-whats-really-going-on/.
81 Tim
Cook, A Message to Our Customers (Feb. 16, 2016),
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/.
82 Julia Edwards, FBI paid more than $1.3 million to break into San Bernardino
iPhone, REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-appleencryption-fbi-idUSKCN0XI2IB. After the FBI reported it had accessed the
phone, Apple demanded that the FBI tell it about the vulnerability used so the
weakness could be patched. Conner Forrest, Apple demands to know how FBI cracked
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Constitutional protections have given U.S. citizens the
freedom to take risks and be creative, and the ability to push back
against government programs that implicate privacy or personal
property. This arrangement greatly facilitated the success of the U.S.
economy and, as a result, U.S. international relations. Of course, the
irony in the situation is that the very freedoms that facilitated the U.S.
rise to superpower status in the physical world now impair U.S.
efforts to be similarly dominant in cyberspace. By contrast,
cyberspace has given U.S. rival States and groups another chance to
be dominant, and some of them are seizing it with both hands. The
lack of freedom may have limited rival States’ innovation and
progress previously, but the same set of circumstances allow their
leadership to push forward in cyberspace, unconstrained by concerns
over privacy and other constitutional rights. There must be a middle
ground that would permit U.S. activities in the area to advance
national security and still provide appropriate protections, even if not
absolute dominance, for citizens’ privacy.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Cyberspace is constantly shifting as new nodes are added and
others disappear. Locations of interest move (a network address can
change) and are concealed (a network address can be spoofed) with
ease. National security laws and strategy were conceived with physical
boundaries in mind, but national borders in cyberspace are porous
and uncertain.83 These factors increase the complexity of cyber
operations. Defining cyberspace more accurately as two separate
elements, infrastructure and content, may help to refocus U.S.
strategy going forward.

San
Bernardino
iPhone,
TECH
REPUBLIC
(Mar.
30,
2016),
http://www.techrepublic.com/article/apple-demands-to-know-how-fbi-crackedsan-bernardino-iphone/.When and if the government has an obligation to disclose
vulnerabilities is another fascinating debate that is beyond the scope of this article.
83 Miller, Brickey & Conti, Why Your Intuition about Cyber Warfare is Probably
Wrong,
SMALL
WARS
JOURNAL
(Nov.
29,
2012),
http://smallwarsjournal.com/print/13573.
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The success of others in the ideosphere, particularly Russia
and ISIS, is frustrating, because it is precisely the type of thing
Americans are typically good at. Generally, the U.S. does well in the
ideosphere (freedom, culture, etc.), but is not as successful as other
actors in driving towards specific goals. If the U.S. hopes to operate
more successfully in cyberspace it needs to look at things differently.
There will be occasions where engaging on cyber infrastructure will
be the best tactic, certainly when it is in conjunction with armed
conflict. In other cases, maximum effectiveness will be found in
taking on the adversary in the ideosphere. Examples may include
debating issues, undercutting positive adversary information,
manipulating information and the trust placed in it, and preventing
the efficient flow of that information.84
England’s dominance in 14th century military affairs wasn’t
due to a secret weapon that no one else could obtain. Rather,
England’s military reigned supreme in the era because its adversaries
feared empowering the public to fully participate in national security.
The dominance endured until England’s rivals decided the rewards of
extending capability beyond the elites to the population outweighed
the risks. America’s adversaries have successfully weaponized social
media.85 How long will it be before the U.S. unleashes its own cyber
longbow, employing non-traditional assets for the on-going clashes in
cyberspace?
Rather than remaining merely another of the “weary giants of
flesh and steel,” there is a need for the U.S. to engage in “the new
home of Mind.”86 U.S. leadership in cyberspace is vital to ensure it
remains a powerful, albeit flawed, force for progress and creation.
84 Maybe sending comedians to engage with ISIS, as the band U-2’s Bono
suggests, would help solve the problem. Or maybe not. Bono: send Amy Schumer and
Chris Rock to fight Islamic State, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/music/2016/apr/13/bono-send-amy-schumerchris-rock-fight-islamic-state-isis.
85 Emerson T. Brooking & Peter W. Singer, War Goes Viral, THE ATLANTIC
(Nov. 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/11/war-goesviral/501125/.
86 John Perry Barlowe, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,
ELECTRONIC FREEDOM FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspaceindependence.
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Competing will require employing citizens in the protection of the
nation, primarily addressing the information that represents human
interaction and all the inherent risks and rewards, with the physical
components of the internet playing a supporting role.
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